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Abstract
Background: In many developing countries, initiatives are underway to strengthen voluntary community based
health insurance as a means of expanding access to affordable care among the informal sector. However, increasing
coverage with voluntary health insurance in low income settings can prove challenging. There are limited studies on
determinants of enrolling in these schemes using mixed methods. This study aims to shed light on the characteristics
of those joining a community health fund, a type of community based health insurance, in Tanzania and the reasons
for their membership and subsequent drop out using mixed methods.
Methods: A cross sectional survey of households in four rural districts was conducted in 2008, covering a total of 1,225
(524 members of CHF and 701 non-insured) households and 7,959 individuals. In addition, 12 focus group discussions
were carried out with CHF members, non-scheme members and members of health facility governing committees in
two rural districts. Logistic regression was used to assess the determinants of CHF membership while thematic analysis
was done to analyse qualitative data.
Results: The quantitative analysis revealed that the three middle income quintiles were more likely to enrol in the CHF
than the poorest and the richest. CHF member households were more likely to be large, and headed by a male than
uninsured households from the same areas. The qualitative data supported the finding that the poor rather than the
poorest were more likely to join as were large families and of greater risk of illness, with disabilities or persons with
chronic diseases. Households with elderly members or children under-five years were also more likely to enrol. Poor
understanding of risk pooling deterred people from joining the scheme and was the main reason for not renewing
membership. On the supply side, poor quality of public care services, the limited benefit package and a lack of provider
choice were the main factors for low enrolment.
Conclusions: Determinants of CHF membership are diverse and improving the quality of health services and
expanding the benefit package should be prioritised to expand voluntary health insurance coverage.
Keywords: Community based health insurance, Community health fund, Enrolment, Adverse selection, Sustainability,
Quality of health services
Background
In recent years, community based health insurance has
been promoted within health financing reforms in many
developing countries [1,2] as a mechanism for raising
additional funds for essential public health services,
enhancing access to care and reducing out-of-pocket
payments [1,3-5]. Community based health insurance
is usually organised and managed by local government
institutions, local health facilities, or non-government
organisations, with significant community involvement
[1,3,6]. Enrolment in such schemes is voluntary, and
premiums tend not to be according to ability to pay,
nor are they risk rated, with schemes often running on
a non-profit basis [3]. Revenue collection mechanisms
vary from place to place. In some cases, contributions
are collected at a specific period in the year, such as
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during the harvest season [7], in other cases people
can join year round [4]. Schemes sometimes promote
individual enrolment, and in other cases couples and
their children are enrolled together [8].
Despite the proven affects of community based health
insurance schemes in enhancing access to services and
financial protection [3,9,10], in many developing countries
there has been limited population enrolment in such
schemes [2-5]. Indeed, in Sub-Saharan Africa coverage
rarely attains more than 10% of the target population [5]
with some exceptions in countries such as Rwanda and
Ghana [11-14].
A number of studies have examined and reviewed the
constraints to increasing enrolment [3-5,8,9,14-18]. Among
the potential barriers to enrolment are affordability of
premiums [15,19], poor quality of health care services
offered to members and limited referral services [4]. Poor
management (unfavourable scheme design) and lack of
trust were also reported in some studies to affect the cover-
age of community based insurance schemes [15,20,21].
Previous studies have employed quantitative methods
such as household surveys [2,5,16,17] or qualitative
methods, such as focus group discussions [18,22] to
examine factors determining enrolment and barriers.
Household surveys can be valuable in exploring household
characteristics associated with insurance membership,
but are less able to shed light on why these patterns are
observed, nor are they able to readily unpack the supply
side and institutional barriers to enrolment; which are
better examined through qualitative methods. There is
limited evidence on the determinants of community
insurance membership using mixed methods enabling a
parallel assessment of demand and supply side factors
underlying enrolment. To address this gap, in this study
we adopted a mixed methods approach to enable an
in-depth examination of membership determinants and
demand and supply side factors explaining enrolment
and drop out of the Community Health Fund (CHF), a
community based health insurance scheme in Tanzania
after more than 10 years of implementation. A previous
study was carried out in Tanzania, which examined the
supply side/institutional barriers to enrolment, through
an assessment of implementation at different levels of
the system [4], however, there has been no subsequent
analysis of these factors, nor an assessment of the char-
acteristics of insured members in this context.
Methods
Study setting
Tanzania introduced the Community Health Fund (CHF),
a form of voluntary community based health insurance
for the rural informal sector in 2001 [4]. The household is
the unit of enrolment and the majority of districts have set
their contribution rate to between US$ 4.2 and US$ 12.7a
per year [23]. The premium rate is the same for all CHF
members within a district but varies across districts.
CHF members register at public health facilities where
premiums are also collected and member households
are subsequently eligible for free primary care at the
selected facility. In some districts limited referral health
care services are also covered. After collection, the funds
are deposited into a cost sharing or CHF account at the
council level [24], and in some districts a percentage of
the funds goes back to the facility and can be used for
drug purchases and minor repairs. To supplement the
revenue generated through household contributions,
the government matches all contributions by members
through a matching grant. Some of the conditions for
accessing the matching grant include having member-
ship records, by-laws and functioning CHF institutional
arrangements [25]. Matching grants are allocated based
on the amount of premium revenue each district collects,
thus those less able to generate contributions receive less
funds [26].
A system of exemptions aimed at ensuring free access
to public health services among vulnerable groups such
as children under-five years of age, pregnant women,
and people with chronic diseases like HIV/AIDS also
exists. A waiver system is in place to protect those who
are unable to pay user fees and to join the CHF, although
in practice this is poorly implemented [27-29].
Council Health Service Boards (CHSBs) and health
facility governing committees (HFGCs) operate at the
district level and at the facility level respectively. Their
role is to improve accountability between health care
providers and communities, ensuring exemptions are
respected and mobilising resources from communities,
such as CHF premiums and administering them. To
date, national CHF coverage remains very low at about
7.1% of the total population [30], compared to the popula-
tion of informal sector workers and their dependents,
which represent more than 70% of the entire population.
However, the government is committed to extending
coverage through the CHF [25].
Data collection and analysis methods
Quantitative data
A cross sectional household survey was conducted in 4
Districts Councils (Singida, Mbulu, Kigoma rural and
Kilosa) in 2008, covering a total of 1,225 (524 members
of CHF and 701 non-insured) households and 7,959
individuals. The districts were selected purposively such
that they had at least 10% of their population covered
by the CHF. Two districts (Kigoma and Kilosa) offered
the basic benefit package to members (outpatient care,
mainly limited to primary facilities), and two (Singida
and Mbulu) had expanded benefits which included
inpatient care.
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A stratified random sample of facilites was selected
within each district based on distance from the district
headquarters for identification of CHF members. We
selected two nearby facilities (less than 30 minutes by
car), two medium distance (between 30 minutes and
one hour) and one far away (more than an hour). We
compiled a list of all CHF member households that had
been a member for at least a year from records at the
sampled health facilities. We then took a random
sample of 30 households from the list. Village leaders
assisted in the identification of the sampled households
in the community. Village leaders also provided a list of
all the non-insured households living within the same
hamlets as the identified CHF members. From this list,
35 non-insured households were picked at random.
The household survey compiled information on house-
hold demographic and social economic characteristics
among other variables. Descriptive analysis of the charac-
teristics of CHF members and the uninsured was first
done, tests for differences in means and proportions were
done using Adjusted Wald F-test. A marginal effects logit
model was run to identify the household characteristics
associated with CHF membership. The reporting of
standard errors adjusts for clustering at the facility level.
We ran a series of diagnostic tests to ensure the model
was correctly specified, to check for goodness of fit,
multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity. The analysis
was done using STATA 11 software.
Qualitative data
Qualitative data were collected to examine in more
depth the demand side constraints to enrolment, as well
as to explore the extent of supply side factors affecting
enrolment and drop-outs. Qualitative data were collected
in two districts: Mbulu and Kigoma rural. Among those
dispensaries selected to collect household survey data, two
facilities were selected; one that was close and one that
was faraway to collect qualitative data. At the dispensaries,
7 to 10 CHF members’ cards were selected at random
and members invited to a focus group discussion
(FGD). Village leaders helped to randomly locate non
members from the same area. Focus group discussions
were also conducted with HFGC members. A total of
12 FGDs were carried out with CHF members, non-
scheme members and members of the HFGC (Table 1).
FGDs were conducted in Kiswahili and tape recorded
with written consent from participants. The data were
then transcribed and translated into English.
Translated data were imported into QSR NVIVO 8 for
coding and processing. Thematic content analysis was
done, which entailed coding data according to key themes
arising from the data. Initial coding was done by the lead
author and a draft code book shared with other members
of the team for comments. The code book had a range
of themes, for example: characteristics of members of the
CHF, reasons for joining the CHF, reasons for dropping
out, and the ways adverse selection affects the scheme’s
sustainability. Validation of the findings was done by
triangulating and synthesizing data across respondent
groups. Verbatim key quotations have been incorporated
in the paper.
Ethics and quality control
All data collection tools were pre-tested for quality con-
trol and field interviewers and supervisors were trained
and supervised by two research coordinators. Debriefing
meetings with survey interviewers were held at the end
of each day to identify challenges and key issues arising
from the field work. Ethical approval was obtained from
the National Institute for Medical Research in Tanzania.
The study was also approved by the Institutional Review
Board of the Ifakara Health Institute. All respondents
were given an information sheet in Swahili explaining
the right to voluntary participation in the study and were
asked to sign a consent form.
Results
Quantitative analysis results
Descriptive statistics
CHF member household heads were more likely than
the heads of uninsured households to be male (89%
versus 79%, p < 0.05); married (73% vs 59%, p < 0.05); older
(46.4 versus 42.9 years, p < 0.1), completed secondary edu-
cation and above (5% vs 3%, p < 0.1), be Christian (63% vs
55%, p < 0.001) and exempted (17% vs 14%, p < 0.001)
(Table 2). CHF households were also more likely to have a
higher number of members (7 vs 6, p < 0.001). There was
also a higher proportion of CHF members than uninsured
households in the sample from Mbulu district (28% versus
24%, p < 0.05) and Kigoma Rural (28% vs 25%, p < 0.001).
There was no significant difference between CHF member
households and the uninsured with respect to any of the
other variables considered.
Determinants of CHF membership
When controlling for a range of variables that could
explain the decision to enrol, wealth was found to be an
important determinant (Table 3). Each wealth group was
Table 1 Overview of FGD’s carried out by district and
stakeholder type
Stakeholder type District Total
Mbulu Kigoma
Health facility committee members 2 2 4
CHF members 2 2 4
Non-insured individuals 2 2 4
Total 6 6 12
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Table 2 Characteristics of CHF members and non-member households
Variable Variable description Total N = 1,225 CHF member Un-insured
n = 524 n = 701
N % n % n %
Gender of the household head,** 1 =male, 1,025 83 468 89 557 79
0 = female
Marital status of the household head,** 1 =married 796 65 383 73 413 59
0 = otherwise
Wealth groups
Poorest, (reference group) 1 = Poorest Household 304 25 107 21 197 29
0 = Otherwise
Second poorest, 294 25 129 25 165 24
Middle, 275 23 122 24 153 22
Second richest, 222 19 102 20 120 17
Least Poor, 1 = Least Poor Household 102 9 49 10 53 8
0 = Otherwise
Educational level of household head
Completed primary level education, 1 = Has completed primary school 921 75 397 78 542 77
0 = Otherwise
Secondary level education and above,* 1 = Has completed secondary
education and above
49 5 27 5 22 3
0 = Otherwise
No formal education, (reference group) 1 = Has no formal education 189 15 75 14 114 16
0 = Otherwise
Districts
Kigoma Rural,*** 1 = Household comes from Kigoma rural district 325 27 149 28 176 25
0 = Otherwise
Kilosa 1 = Household comes from Kilosa district 246 20 71 13 175 24
0 = Otherwise
Mbulu,** 1 = Household comes from Mbulu district 323 26 149 28 1744 24
0 = Otherwise
Singida Rural 1 = Household comes from Singida Rural district 331 27 155 30 176 25
0 = Otherwise
Employment status of household head
Employed in the formal sector,** 1 = Household head is employed in formal sector 47 4 28 5 19 3
0 = otherwise
Employed in the informal sector 1 = Household head is employed in the
informal sector
1118 91 478 91 640 91
0 = otherwise
Not employed, (reference group) 1 = Household head is not employed 20 2 6 1 14 2
0 = otherwise
Health status of the household head
Health poor 1 = Household head has poor self
assessed health
114 9 53 10 61 9
0 = otherwise
Health average 1 = Household head has average self
assessed health
361 30 175 34 186 27
0 = otherwise
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between 1-12% more likely to enrol in the CHF relative to
the poorest group. However, the least poor were no more
likely to join than the poorest. Larger households were
more likely to be CHF members, with each additional
household member increasing the chance of being a
member by 4.3%. Christian’s were 6.7% more likely to
be members than those from other religious groups.
Test statistics showed that the model was correctly spe-
cified, and there was no evidence of heteroskedasticity
or multicollinearity.
Qualitative analysis results
Demand side factors explaining membership
The qualitative analysis revealed that household income,
occupation, household size, poor health status of house-
hold members, and level of understanding of the concept
of risk pooling were prominent demand side factors
associated with enrolment.
During FGDs with all respondent groups there were
mixed feelings as to whether the premium was fair and
affordable for everyone in the community. For some,
household income, and type of occupation, were said to
be a positive predictor of joining the CHF, confirming
the quantitative findings. People doing small business,
farming and/or those having cattle were seen to be better
able to pay the premium, compared to people without.
“You can sell one or two hens and manage to
pay 5000 Tanzanian shilling (Tsh), it’s cheap
but not everybody has a business or cattle, thus
[joining] becomes difficult” (FGD, Mbulu DC,
HFGC members).
In both districts it was observed that members of
the National Health Insurance Fund for the formal
sectorb, which provides cover for civil servants, also
enrol in the CHF to provide cover to their uninsured
dependents.
“We have teachers who are civil servants covered
by the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF)
and they are also members of the CHF to extend
coverage to other dependants” (FGD, Mbulu DC,
HFGC members).
Some FGD participants reported that the poor, those
with low income and food insecurity would have difficulty
affording the premium, especially during poor harvest
seasons.
Table 2 Characteristics of CHF members and non-member households (Continued)
Health Good, (reference group) 1 = Household head has good self
assessed health
732 60 291 56 441 64
0 = otherwise
Religion of household head*** 1 = Christian 718 58 330 63 388 55
0 =Muslim, or Hindu/Buddhist or no religion
Exemption eligibility of
household head***
1 = eligible for exemptions 190 16 87 17 103 14
0 = not eligible for exemptions
Continuous variables
Mean age of the household head in years, Mean [sd]* 1225 44.4 [13.3] 524 46.4 [12.7] 701 42.9 [13.5]
Mean number of children under 18, Mean [sd] 1225 3.6 [1.9] 524 4.0 [2.1] 701 3.4 [1.2]
Household size, Mean [sd]*** 1225 6.2 [2.6 ] 524 7.0 [2.5] 701 5.5 [2.6]
*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%.
Table 3 Logit model on the determinants of people
joining CHF
Variable Marginal effects coeff p-values
Gender* 0.109 0.059
Second poorest** 0.110 0.015
Middle* 0.096 0.091
Second richest 0.112 0.115
Least Poor 0.057 0.604
Age 0.010 0.273
Age squared −0.000 0.565
Completed primary education −0.002 0.950
Completed secondary education
and above
−0.016 0.871
Household size*** 0.043 0.000
Marital status 0.044 0.253
Religion* 0.067 0.096
Household head eligible
for exemptions
−0.025 0.675
Number of observations 1,112
Wald 155.46
Prob 0.000
Pseudo 0.078
Log pseudolikelihood −698.46
*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%.
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“Some people are poor, so [they] can’t afford the
premium and nowadays earnings from farming are
very low” (FGD, Mbulu DC, HFGC members).
“We have many people who can’t even afford to buy
food; it is not possible for them to pay Tsh 5000”
(FGD, Kigoma DC, CHF members).
However, there was a common view that the premium
was less than the sum of out-of-pocket payments one
would otherwise pay for more than one visit, which served
as an incentive to join the scheme irrespective of income.
“Everybody in this area is capable of paying this
amount, Tsh 5000/=. We join the scheme because the
premium is very low” (FGD, Kigoma DC, CHF member).
“User fees are expensive when you go to the dispensary
several times in a year, compared to the CHF
premium” (FGD, Mbulu DC, Uninsured).
During the focus group discussions, participants also
indicated that large households were more likely to join
the CHF. Repeated illness or multiple concurrent illnesses
within the household were additional perceived risk
factors for joining the CHF, particularly among larger
households.
“The main reason for joining is having an extended
family. If you join you start to experience a relief from
those expenses, especially when you have to take care
of more than one person, or repeated illness cases”
(FGD, Kigoma DC, CHF members).
“One day I brought my son to the clinic, and a few
days later my wife was also sick, though she was only
given aspirin at the facility as there were no other
drugs. She was supposed to go and buy outside the
facility [other drugs prescribed by the doctor] but we
didn’t pay at the facility because of the CHF card”
(FGD, Mbulu DC, HFGC members).
Large households with unstable income were reported
to be likely to join the scheme to ensure access to health
care when needed.
“Due to the instability of my income, which depends
on farming which is seasonal and unpredictable, I have
no other choice; my whole family is looking at me,
depending on me,” (FGD, Kigoma DC, HFGC members).
Whilst health status did not emerge as a significant
predictor of membership in the quantitative analysis, the
qualitative data indicated that households with people with
disabilities, older members, and with members suffering
from chronic diseases such as epilepsy were joining the
scheme more than other groups. Having vulnerable people
in the family was seen as a push factor; these groups
were seen to be more prone to multiple concurrent
cases of illness or repeated illness, making membership
more attractive.
“My parents depend on me to take care of them when
they fall sick, and I have my nephew with skin problems
and my own children. Having a CHF card has been
helpful especially to my nephew who visits the hospital
most often” (FGD, Mbulu DC, HFGC members).
“If your dependants also experience severe illness
often you will suffer even more. You will be paying
money every day to buy drugs. That’s why people
decide to join insurance though it doesn’t cover all
you need [the benefit package is limited]” (FGD,
Kigoma DC, CHF members).
Poor understanding of risk pooling was reported to
deter enrolment and membership renewal. For instance
members felt that their contributions should be used
to cover their own use of services, with the money
remaining available to them if they did not seek care.
“Why should I pay again to join for the next year, while
I know my dependants didn’t fall sick this year? I didn’t
use my money!” (FGD, Kigoma DC, Uninsured).
Supply side factors affecting membership
The main supply side factors identified to limit enrolment
include quality of health services; access to the govern-
ment matching grants, portability of the CHF membership
card, limited access to referral services, and the exemption
and waiver policy.
Low quality of health care at public facilities was one
of the main factors discouraging people from joining or
from renewing their insurance membership. The key
aspects of quality reported by respondents were: the
shortage of drugs, lack of diagnostic equipment, long
waiting hours. When drugs are out of stock, CHF mem-
bers have to buy drugs at private pharmacies.
“Now, what made me drop out of this scheme it’s the
shortage of drugs at the facility. And at the drug shop
you can pay more than half of the fees that you paid
to become a member of the scheme. This is double
payment, it is better that I don’t join any more”
(FGD, Mbulu DC, uninsured).
“When you go to the facility to be told to go and buy
drugs at the private pharmacy, there is no difference
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between those who are insured and those un-insured”
(FGD, Kigoma DC, CHF members).
Many dispensaries have no diagnostic equipment. This
resulted in bypassing to higher level referral facilities or
private facilities that are not covered by the CHF.
“Sometimes they don’t treat what was supposed to
be treated at the dispensary, because there is no
diagnostic equipment” (FGD, Mbulu DC, Uninsured).
Uncertainty about the availability of medical supplies
and limited working hours at the dispensary was also
reported to affect membership levels.
“....But there is no guarantee of the service provided.
Today you get a complete service tomorrow half of the
service, this is what discourages us” (FGD, Mbulu DC,
CHF members).
Another concern with public facilities was long waiting
hours, which was thought to particularly affect CHF
members, as they can only benefit from services at one
health facility.
“Often one can spend almost the whole day waiting at
the facility, with only two staff to take care of everyone,
it is not easy. CHF member can’t opt to go elsewhere, as
they are restricted to one facility [where they first sign
up to the scheme]” (FGD, Kigoma DC, Uninsured).
In principle, the CHF premiums together with the
government sponsored matching grant, was intended for
districts to buy drugs and improve facility supplies. How-
ever, facilities reported difficulty accessing these supplies
which combined with delays in the district getting the
matching grant affected the efforts to improve services.
“There is no improvement in the service, even if the
government also contributes to the fund” (FGD,
Kigoma DC, HFGC members).
“We were told if we contribute, the government would
match our contribution by the same amount” (FGD,
Mbulu DC, HFGC members).
The limited benefit package was also reported to affect
membership, both in terms of the lack of referral benefits
(in districts where this was not covered) combined with
the fact that cover is only provided at a single facility. This
factor was particularly found to discourage the better off
from joining as they could afford to access care at private
facilities by paying out of pocket. It was indicated by most
of the respondents that the referral services not covered
by the CHF are more expensive than primary care services
covered by the scheme.
“The scheme only covers services at one facility, when
you travel to other villages you will have to pay, and
wait a long time to get attended to and that is
discouraging” (FGD, Kigoma DC, uninsured).
In contrast, the inclusion of referral services in the
benefit package in Mbulu had motivated many people to
join the scheme; particularly those living close to the
referral facility, but the transport costs still discourages
some members from going.
“Hospital care is included in the CHF and the CHMT
is working hard to ensure there are enough drugs for
members, however you won’t always get the drugs, to
be honest there are still some challenges” (FGD, Mbulu
DC, HFGC members).
“Yes we have been told, we can go to the district
hospital but the transport cost discourages members to
go there” (FGD, Mbulu DC, CHF members).
There were mixed views about the government’s
exemption policy and its interaction with the CHF.
Some saw the policy as deterring people from joining
the CHF as public primary care is officially free for many
services. However, there were also complaints that
exemptions were often not fully implemented, and so it
was felt by others that households would still join the
scheme to increase their access to care.
“There are a lot of free services […] sometimes people see
no need [to join] because there are groups accessing free
services” (FGD, Kigoma DC, CHF members).
“Sometimes it is better to join, as for instance old
people are supposed to get free services, but when they
visit the health facility they often pay. They provide
only free childhood vaccinations and clinic services”
(FGD, Mbulu DC, Uninsured).
Discussion
This study identified the demand and supply side factors
affecting the decision to enrol and remain enrolled in
the CHF in Tanzania. On the demand side, although the
scheme is aimed at the informal sector, households who
are employed in the formal sector were more likely to be
members of the CHF. A study in Laos also found that
married and employed household heads were more likely
to be insured and remain insured [21]. Our study found
an association between membership and the gender of
the household head, contrary to a recent review by
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Acharya [9]. However, a study in Burkina Faso found
that there was no effect of gender on enrolment [5] but
that male headed households had a higher willingness to
pay for insurance and female headed households were
more likely to drop out [31,32].
Middle income groups were also more likely to join,
with the poorest quintile, defined as having food insecur-
ity, and least poor being less likely to join. The lack of
benefit from community based health insurance to the
poorest was also reported elsewhere [4,21]. Introducing a
mechanism for exemption from premiums for those
unable to pay could be used as an approach for reaching
out to the poorest, and has been employed elsewhere [14].
In Tanzania, district councils are supposed to budget for
the poor and provide free CHF cards to poor households,
but in practice this does not occur due to the lack of
clearly defined criteria for identifying the poor and a
lack of earmarked funds to cover their costs. In order
to promote such an approach, funds need to be made
available to districts and the poor identified with
support of community development personnel [28].
However, there are recognised challenges in effectively
targeting the poor in low income settings in general
and in Tanzania specifically [28,33].
The rich were more likely to opt out to have freedom
to purchase services from private providers. This in
some ways echoes the findings from a study in Ghana
[14] that found the rich were more likely to enrol but
also more likely to drop out due to dissatisfaction with
care, and because they could afford alternative providers.
These findings are nuanced compared to that reported
in the review by Acharya and a recent study in Laos
where income was found to be a positive predictor of
enrolment [9,21]. Unlike other studies, education did
not emerge as a key determinant of enrolment in the
Tanzanian setting [9,14,21,31,32].
Our study highlighted evidence of adverse selection.
Large households (especially those with children and/
or elderly members); and people with chronic illness
were more likely to join the scheme due to the greater
perceived risk of care seeking. Risk of illness and risk
of incurring health care costs were important factors
underpinning the decision to join the CHF. Studies in
China, Laos and Nicaragua also found evidence of
adverse selection with sicker households being more
likely to enrol [21,34,35]. In Burkina, households with
few children were more likely to drop out of insurance
[31], and in Senegal households with children under
five years were more likely to enrol [36].
The findings indicate that the decision to join the CHF
is typically based on a rational comparison of the premium
and expected cost of care when paying out of pocket.
Expected costs were higher for large households, or
households with greater health risk (young children,
elderly members, chronic conditions), explaining the
greater likelihood of enrolling among these groups,
with the exception of the very poorest who could not
afford the premium and wealthier groups who prefer to
maintain provider choice. The greater likelihood of house-
holds with sick individuals joining the CHF was not
identified through the quantitative analysis, possibly due
to the lack of sensitivity of our health status measure. The
voluntary nature of community based health insurance
[15] means it can be prone to adverse selection. Adverse
selection is potentially concerning for the financial sus-
tainability of community based health insurance, as those
households within the risk pool have a greater than
average expected treatment cost. Adverse selection also
limits risk sharing between the wealthy and the poor [15].
While household rather than individual level enrolment
has been reported to reduce adverse selection [5], this
study has shown that adverse selection can also happen
when enrolment is at the household level.
The design of community based health insurance (CBHI)
can help address this issue. Currently, in many districts,
the CHF has no mechanism to limit adverse selection.
Households can join at any time, so can opt into the
scheme when they become sick and need care. One
district in Tanzania has established a waiting time (or a
qualifying period) before which members can use health
services [24], this has been reported to be an effective
mechanism to contain the effect of adverse selection in
CBHI [15]. The use of individual rather than household
premiums would also be beneficial, as larger households
are currently more likely to join. Another approach to
avoid adverse selection is group enrolment, whereby
groups such as co-operative members, or employers, or
schools enrol together. This model operates in Uganda to
cover students [37] and in some parts of Tanzania this
approach has been highly effective in reducing drop outs
compared to individual enrolment [24,38] and is effective
in reducing adverse selection [39].
Finally, the findings indicated that lack of understand-
ing of the risk pooling principle was a factor limiting
enrolment and explaining drop out. Indications of
limited understanding of the insurance concept, which
includes risk pooling were also present in a study in
Laos and Bukina Faso [21,40] and was reported to affect
enrolment in a community health financing scheme in
Uganda [41]. To address this issue further community
sensitisation to raise awareness and understanding about
the insurance concept is required. In Tanzania, there
have been sensitization activities conducted by the
National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) who are cur-
rently managing the CHF to raise awareness among the
population about the importance of pre-payments, which
appears to have had had initial positive effects on
enrolment [25].
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Our study also identified a number of supply side
factors constraining enrolment including a lack of drugs
and diagnostic equipment at primary level facilities
limited provider choice and a lack of referral care in
some areas. Drug stock outs and lack of referral care
results in incomplete financial protection for households.
To address the problem of drug stock outs some districts
have introduced buffer stocks, whereby the district buys
additional drugs, often using CHF revenue. Facilities
are also allowed to access reserved drugs at the district
headquarters during stock outs in addition to the regular
drug kit [24]. However, in many districts, the CHF
revenue which can be used to finance drug and supply
purchases or the repair of equipment, minor facility
renovation is only partially used. Such funds are often
held at districts accounts, and facilities have to make
claims for these resources. However, in many cases the
facilities do not claim due to a lack of provider under-
standing of the process of fund allocation which is
often not transparent [25].
Concerns about the lack of inclusion of referral care
and associated transport costs in the benefit package
have also been reported elsewhere [15]. The qualitative
data in our study highlighted that respondents would
find insurance more attractive if it covered higher cost
referral services rather than primary care which is
generally inexpensive due to the exemption policy for
many services. However, this needs to be weighed against
the potential impact on premiums of the inclusion of such
services. Recent moves in Tanzania to promote engage-
ment with the private sector in the provision of quality
health services in areas with limited public facilities
through service agreements (or contracts) [24] should
facilitate a widening of the benefit package. A number
of districts have entered into contract with faith-based
hospitals to provide referral care to CHF members, which
has been associated with higher enrolment rates [23]. It
is also expected the primary health service development
program (often referred as Mpango wa Maendeleo ya Afya
ya Msingi (MMAM)) will improve service accessibility
and availability by increasing the number of skilled staff,
drugs and other medical supplies to the facilities.
Two low income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have
achieved high health insurance coverage: Rwanda and
Ghana. In Rwanda, coverage is over 80% and in Ghana
over 60% coverage has been attained [11,13,14]. In
Rwanda, insurance enrolment is incentivised through a
performance based financing scheme, which also aims to
improve health care services [11,12]. In Ghana the
scheme includes both formal and informal sector workers
[13,14]. Tanzania recently piloted a pay for performance
(P4P) scheme which it plans to roll out nationally [42].
Including CHF coverage as one of the P4P targets might
offer an effective mechanism of increasing coverage,
especially if parallel improvements in service delivery are
noted. Further gains in terms of scheme design and
revenue availability could be made by formerly linking
the CHF to the NHIF, a mandatory scheme for the
formal sector [25]. The takeover of the management of
CHF by the NHIF is a positive step towards the ultim-
ate merger of these schemes [25]. However, at present
CHF administration costs remain substantial raising
concerns about financial sustainability [43].
This study suffers from a number of limitations. We
were unable to quantitatively assess the determinants of
drop out, as there were insufficient numbers of drop
outs within our uninsured sample. The analysis focused
on community level stakeholders, so we did not examine
the views of higher level stakeholders that may have shed
more light on institutional factors constraining enrolment.
Conclusion
There is a combination of demand and supply side factors
constraining sustained enrolment in the CHF among the
population. CBHI design needs to recognise these factors
and build in mechanisms to attract members whilst deter-
ring from adverse selection, stimulating the supply side to
meet client expectations whilst ensuring financial viability.
Raising awareness and understanding of the risk pooling
principle is also essential among the population. Scheme
managers need to ensure that the scheme remains appeal-
ing to the informal sector as a whole and not just the
poor. Ideally, CBHI needs to be introduced alongside
other initiatives to ensure effective use of funds generated
to enable service quality improvements to members. Re-
ferral services should ideally be prioritised for inclusion in
the benefit package and appropriate contractual relations
are required to facilitate this process. Given the challenges
of appropriate design, and the costs of administering the
CHF, integration with existing national health insurance
schemes should be considered. Tax funding is likely to re-
main the only viable mechanism for funding the poorest.
Endnotes
aThe exchange rate at the time of the study 2008 was
Tanzanian shilling (Tsh) 1178 to US$1.
bNational Health Insurance Funds (NHIF) is a com-
pulsory health insurance covering civil servants officially
introduced in 2001.
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